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Abstract 
The author proposes reforms to simplify the current federal gift tax system, foster 
uncomplicated outright transfers, eliminate valuation distortions, and increase taxpayer 
return compliance.  In order to obtain those results, the author’s simpler verifiab le gift 
tax would incorporate hard-to-complete rules of transfer taxation, harmonize the gift and 
estate tax regimes, and grant gift tax preference inducements to encourage the filing of 
timely gift tax returns. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to create a simpler and more accountable federal gift 
tax.
1
  In order to do that, this author proposes to address the issues of (1) valuation 
distortions; (2) gift completion rules; (3) current preferences for lifetime gifts; and (4) 
compliance. 
Present law provides the opportunity for attorneys and their clients to benefit by 
infusing complexity into the gift tax system
2
 and has penalized those taxpayers who have 
opted not to adopt convoluted, empty contrivances.  It is time to adopt a rule of law that 
encourages and rewards simplic ity.
3
  When the taxpayer complicates valuation, the value 
of his or her property interest should be interpreted in a way adverse to that taxpayer‘s 
interest.
4
  This position is justified by: (1) the element of taxpayer volition 
unaccompanied by any reasonable rationalization (apart from slashing transfer tax 
liability) for the taxpayer‘s employing the convolution; (2) the lack of a business-world 
counterpart to using entities to reduce the value of a company‘s assets without a business-
motivated rationale; and (3) the unwarranted revenue loss from the resulting discounted 
valuation and from the increased revenue costs (auditing, appraisals, and litigation) that 
accompany these tortuous transactions.  Essentially, the law should be reformed so that 
                                                 
1 While similar abuses are found in other areas of taxation, even in other transfer tax areas like in 
the estate tax, this article is focused on a discussion of the federal gift tax system.  Also, while the gift, 
income, and estate tax charitable deduction rules need to be changed to curtail abuses, and the gift and estate 
marital deduction provisions should be reformed to reflect an equal partnership and power between the 
spouses, they are beyond the purview of this article.  This author has written about some of those charitable 
and marital deduction issues in other articles.  See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich: The Façade 
Easement Deduction, 34 VA. TAX REV. 229 (2014); Wendy C. Gerzog, The New Super-Charged PAT (Power 
of Appointment Trust), 48 HOUS. L. REV. 507 (2011); Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 
OR. L. REV. 1133 (2009); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and 
Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995).  This article will also not cover the capital gains 
and gift and bequest basis issues, although this author‘s opinions on these issues are much in line with 
Professor Dodge‘s proposal for deemed realization.  See generally Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization 
Approach Is Superior to Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 
TAX L. REV. 421 (2001).  While capital gains rates, basis rules, and transfer tax rates clearly overlap with 
each other, affecting realizations and the timing of transfers, that analysis is also beyond the scope of this 
article.  On that issue, see, STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX‘N, 112TH CONG., M ODELING THE FEDERAL 
REVENUE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 21 (Joint Comm. Print 2012). 
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Pennell, Wealth Transfer Taxation: ‘Transfer’ Defined, 128 TAX NOTES 615 
(Aug. 9, 2010) (―Valuation is the most controversial and pervasive topic in estate planning today.  Much 
valuation controversy reflects ‗value‘ used as a verb: how value is determined and how it is altered for wealth 
transfer tax purposes. . . . There is little more than general bromides that are principled, concrete, or reliable 
that can be gleaned from one situation and transported to another.‖). 
3 One of the fundamental goals of a tax system is simplicity.  See Dept. of the Treas., Blueprints for 
Basic Tax Reform (Treas. Report Jan. 17, 1977) (―The first part of this report is devoted to clarifying the 
goals of the tax system, attempting to give specific content to the universally recognized objectives of equity, 
efficiency, and simplicity.‖); Dept. of Treas., 1 Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity and Economic Growth 15 
(Treas. Report Nov. 27, 1984) (―An important goal of the Treasury Department study of fundamental tax 
reform is simplification.‖).  In addition, the goal of simplicity in the transfer tax area is reflected in the 
Supreme Court‘s holding in Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).  See Lockard v. Comm’r, 166 F.2d 
409 (1st Cir. 1948); Steinberg v. Comm‘r, 141 T.C. 258 (2013); infra text accompanying notes 7–10. 
4 See Robert N. Macris, Open Valuation and the Completed Transfer: A Problem Area in Federal 
Gift Taxation, 34 TAX L. REV. 273, 304 (1978) (―[T]he real point [of Robinette] was that the donor, despite 
the retention of an interest, would be taxed on the amount of the entire transfer when the value of the retained 
interest was not of certain value.‖). 
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―tax minimization‖ is not equated with an artifice that undermines the integrity of the tax 
system itself.
 5 
In Robinette v. Helvering, the donor created a reversionary interest that depended 
not only on survivorship but also on her daughter‘s death without issue surviving to age 
21.
6
  The Supreme Court stated: 
It may be true . . . that trust instruments . . . frequently create ‗a complex 
aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities . . . .‘  But before 
one . . . is entitled to deduction from his gift tax on the basis that he had 
retained some of these complex strands it is necessary that he at least 
establish the possibility of approximating what value he holds.
7
 
A broadened corollary to this holding that seems appropriate and more than 
timely in the context of family entity discounts is that when a taxpayer creates such an 
entity and transfers liquid assets to it in order to obtain valuation discounts for estate 
planning purposes, he or she is no longer a seller under the fair market value definition
8
 
and is outside the real business world where such interests are generally traded.  Indeed, 
the government‘s valuation expert in Holman v. Commissioner shined a light on the 
reality of these contrivances when he stated that it was unlikely that a third party would 
accept the sale or use restrictions of the family limited partnership (FLP) agreement; 
clarifying on cross-examination, he said: ―What I mean is . . . the issue [of transfer 
restrictions] wouldn‘t arise, because nobody at arm’s length would get into this deal.‖9 
Thus, the first rule in a simpler verifiable gift tax is a valuation rule intended to 
strip interests in such taxpayer-created non-business family entities of any illiquidity 
(non-transferability) and minority discounts
10
 under the theory that when one creates a 
family estate planning contrivance, no tax benefits should be available to reduce the value 
of the entity‘s underlying assets.  By disallowing those tax benefits, in addition to the cost 
of creating and maintaining such family entities,
11
 despite claims to the contrary,
12
 no one 
would create these devices. 
                                                 
5See, e.g., Erhard Seminars Training v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 890 (1986) (―While a taxpayer 
has the right to minimize his taxes by whatever means the law permits, this right does not bestow upon the 
taxpayer the right to structure paper arrangements that do not stand on the solid foundation of economic 
reality.‖). 
6 Robinette, 318 U.S. at 188. 
7 Id. 
8 See Wendy C. Gerzog, Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone Awry, 61 TAX LAW. 775 
(2008) (explaining that the fair market value definition in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) implicitly requires a 
seller (the asset holder) to want to maximize the value of an asset in order to supply the proper tension with 
the buyer who wants to minimize cost.  A seller who wants to minimize the value of his property is not, by 
any reasonable definition, a seller.). 
9 Holman v. Comm‘r, 130 T.C. 170, 198 (2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
10 As suggested in the text, there would be one exemption from the simple valuation rule: a family 
business exemption, which would require an ongoing, active family business and not one created or 
maintained primarily for the management or holding of investments. 
11  See, e.g., Kiara Ashanti, What Is a Family Limited Partnership (FLP) – Pros & Cons, M ONEY 
CRASHERS: YOUR GUIDE TO FINANCIAL FITNESS, available at http://www.moneycrashers.com/family-limited-
partnership-flp/ (―Setting up an FLP can cost anywhere between $5,000 to $10,000 dollars [sic] with ongoing 
costs after setup.‖); Frequently Asked Questions About Family Limited Partnerships, THE TEXAS PROBATE 
WEBSITE, available at http://www.texasprobate.net/faqs/flpfaq.htm (―Because the organizational costs can be 
substantial, families with business assets of less than $2 million rarely find it advantageous to establish an 
FLP.‖). 
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The second rule in a simpler gift tax would be to adopt a hard-to-complete rule of 
transfer taxation.
13
  That change from the current system would eliminate much of the 
confusion generated by the gift completion regulations
14
 and would eliminate the tax 




Under the simpler gift tax proposal, for a gift to be complete, the donor must 
relinquish all interests in, and control over, the transferred property. Instead of drawing 
unsatisfying lines among different divestments of control and of relying on actuarial 
techniques that may be manipulated to avoid transfer tax, a simple gift tax would apply 
only to transfers with the donor‘s complete renunciation of all interests and control in the 
property.  Retained interests or powers would constitute incomplete gratuitous transfers 
that would be taxed in the donor‘s estate.16  That simple rule would coordinate well with 
the estate tax provisions and would eliminate instances where a transfer could under 
current law be subject to both transfer taxes,
17
 albeit with present law offsets in the 
calculations of the estate tax to prevent double taxation.
18
  That rule would deny the 
donor of complex transfers the benefit of value freezing and any additional benefits 
available for lifetime transfers.
19
 That rule would also encourage outright transfers of 
property. 
                                                                                                                                     
12 See, e.g., Owen G. Fiore, FLPs Are Good Business, Not a Party or Game, 99 TAX NOTES 289 
(2003). 
13 This article does not analyze the effects of carryover gift tax basis rules. 
14 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2. 
15GRAT is an acronym for a grantor retained annuity trust.  Because of valuation abuses in the area 
of grantor retained interest gifts, wherein the retained interest was overvalued in order to undervalue the 
grantor‘s gift, most grantor retained interests are given a zero value under the provisions of I.R.C. § 2702.  
See I.R.C. § 2702 (2012).  GRATs, wherein the transferor retains an annuity interest in a trust, are 
specifically allowed under that Code section to permit the value of the transferred property to be reduced by 
the actuarially determined value of the annuity interest because that type of fixed retained interest was 
deemed to be a more reliable measure of the grantor‘s retained interest than the more easily manipulated 
retained variable income interest.  However, if the value of the annuity is fixed at a very high amount, the 
transferred interest may be valued at or near zero.  In Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 589 (2000), acq., 
2003-2 C.B. 964, the Tax Court invalidated then Example 5 of Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(e), but also implicitly 
validated the donor‘s use of short-term two-year zeroed-out GRATs that can effectuate tax-free transfers.  See 
JOSEPH M. DODGE, WENDY C. GERZOG & BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, FEDERAL TAXES ON GRATUITOUS 
TRANSFERS: LAW AND PLANNING 451-53 (2011) [hereinafter DODGE, GERZOG, & CRAWFORD]. 
16 Other scholars have proposed rules to deal with valuation problems and gift completion.  See, 
e.g., Mitchell M. Gans, Gift Tax: Valuation Difficulties and Gift Completion, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 493, 
536 (1983) (―Thus, the valuation-difficulty rule should be applied to all gifts not immediately capable of 
valuation if: (1) an interest charge is imposed to neutralize the deferral; (2) only those post -severance events 
of a revelation character are permitted to enter the tax base; and (3) the death-completion rule is adopted to 
prevent tax avoidance.‖). 
17 For example, under Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d) and 25.2511-2(e), respectively, gifts with donor 
retained control over the timing or manner of the gift and joint gifts that are made together with someone 
holding a substantial adverse interest to the exercise of a donor retained power are completed gifts; however, 
they are nonetheless subject to the estate tax under I.R.C. § 2036 or § 2038 if the donor has retained those 
powers at his death (or, under I.R.C. § 2035(a)(2) or § 2038, if he has released them within three years of his 
death).  See I.R.C. §§ 2035(a)(2), 2036, 2038 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d)–(e); see also Lober v. U.S., 
346 U.S. 335 (1953); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943). 
18 See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2) (2012).  For further explication, see DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, 
supra note 15, at 449-50. 
19 See infra Part IV. 
2015] A SIMPLER VERIFIABLE GIFT TAX 187 
This article will review the present preferences allotted to gifts
20
 and the policy 
considerations to justify them.  Arguably, except for a small annual exclusion, there is no 
cogent argument to retain any of the other gift tax benefits.  While this author thus 
acknowledges that she has not found convincing data that requires the preservation of 
most gift tax benefits, she nevertheless proposes that the simpler gift tax retain at least 
some of those preferences in order to encourage easily valued and reported lifetime 
transfers and to compensate for the revenue loss attached to the adoption of a hard-to-
complete rule for gift tax gift completion. 
Inevitably, the gift tax simplification rules would reduce the gift tax revenue now 
generated by complex transactions.  Although the gift tax was created to generate current 
revenue,
21
 in addition to serving as a backstop for both the estate tax
22
 and the income 
tax,
23
 this article suggests that by limiting or denying preferences for lifetime gifts under 
certain circumstances, the simplification and verification rules may serve to underline the 
tax saving accorded simple and reported taxable gifts that, in turn, may increase those 
preferred lifetime transfers, ultimately resulting in additional revenue.
24
 In other words, 
while wealthy people may be all right with complex, attorney-involved strategies, they 
may actually prefer to make simple, tax-favored gifts. 
However, the simpler gift tax proposal would make some changes to the 
exclusions currently provided under section 2503.  Specifically, the annual exclusion 
would be reduced to $2,000 per donee per year in outright gifts in order to cover de 
minimis holiday or occasion gifts and to eliminate both tax-free wealth transfers of 
                                                 
20 The benefits include the exclusions under I.R.C. § 2503, a tax exclusive base, gift splitting, 
valuation freezing, and either passing the post-gift income to a lower bracket donee or creating an 
intentionally defective grantor trust (―IDGT‖).  See infra Part IV.  Creating an IDGT is a way of freezing the 
value of the asset by making a taxable gift.  As the owner of income under the grantor trust rules, the grantor 
can further reduce his taxable estate by paying the income taxes on the income without incurring an 
additional gift tax for those income tax payments, which legally are the grantor‘s own income tax liabilities.  
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX‘N, 112TH CONG., M ODELING THE FEDERAL REVENUE EFFECTS OF CHANGES 
IN ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 24 (Joint Comm. Print 2012). 
21 See STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL., FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION: CASES AND M ATERIALS 
5 (3d ed. 1987) (―By 1932 the country had entered into the years of depression.  Reduced tax yields from the 
falling national income and increasing expenditures brought about deficits.  Congress, in trying to overcome 
the deficits, not only adopted the gift tax and increased the income tax rates but also strengthened the estate 
tax. . . . Thus in 1932 Congress decided that the transfer taxes should be an important source of revenue to the 
federal government.‖); Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift Taxation, 9 
FLA. TAX REV. 875, 913 (2010) (explaining that the gift tax was enacted to provide incentives for making 
current taxable gifts in order to produce much needed revenue during the Depression; ―In effect Congress 
told wealthy taxpayers, you can pay us now or you can pay us later.  But, they added one key proviso: If you 
pay us now, you'll pay far less.  The gift tax thus wasn't designed to prevent estate tax avoidance.  Rather, it 
was carefully designed to encourage such avoidance.‖). 
22 H.R. REP . NO. 72-708, at 8 (1932); S. REP . NO. 72-665, at 11 (1932); see United States v. Irvine, 
511 U.S. 224, 234 (1994); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (―[T]he gift tax serves to supplement the 
estate tax.‖); Sanford’s Estate v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939). 
23H.R. REP . NO. 72-708, at 8 (1932); S. REP . NO. 72-665, at 11 (1932); see Smith v. Shaughnessy, 
318 U.S. at 179 n. 1 (―The gift tax was passed not only to prevent estate tax avoidance, but also to prevent 
income tax avoidance through reducing yearly income and thereby escaping the effect of progressive surtax 
rates.‖); Sanford’s Estate, 308 U.S. at 47 (―One purpose of the gift  tax was to prevent or compensate for the 
loss of surtax upon income where large estates are split up by gifts to numerous donees.‖).  
24 To boost current revenue, the government may also want to consider touting the benefits of 
making these simple tax-favored gifts.  The simpler verifiable gift tax will make marketing lifetime gifts 
more accessible and hence much easier to promote. 
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greater amounts and Crummey
25
 trusts.  While limiting the annual exclusion, which was 
intended to obviate the record-keeping difficulties involved in small gifts, this article 
proposes to amend trusts to minors under section 2503(c)
26
 to allow ―minor‖ trusts to 
extend the 2503(b) exclusion to cover donees until age 30.  At that time, however, the 
trust would need to terminate and its assets be distributed.
27
  The payout requirement of 
section 2503(c) at age 21 has always been a concern for donors
28
 and most estate planners 
use techniques to discourage the termination of these trusts.
29
  The new rule would 
alleviate that unease and shorten the actual term of minor trusts. 
In addition, the simpler verifiable gift tax would expand the exclusion under 
section 2503(e) to other consumption type transfers.  The amended statute would state 
that these exclusions, which are additional to the annual exclusion, are intended to cover 
consumption items and, therefore, do not apply to any transfer that, in fact, is primarily 
an unconsumed gratuitous property wealth transfer. 
Currently, section 2503(e) excludes certain tuition and medical payments from 
the gift tax.
30
  This article proposes three additions to this part of the exclusion statute: (1) 
                                                 
25 See Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).  In a Crummey trust, ―[e]ach beneficiary 
is given the power, exercisable annually, to withdraw from the trust an amount equal to the lesser of (a) the 
amount (if any) transferred to the trust by the grantor during that year or (b) an amount equal to the maximum 
annual exclusion.  If the power is not exercised, the gift amounts become part of the trust corpus and cease to 
be subject to the demand power.‖  DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 131.  For a discussion of 
the case and an expanded discussion of a Crummey trust, see DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 15 at 
131-41. 
26 I.R.C. § 2503(c) provides: 
No part of a gift to an individual who has not attained the age of 21 years on the date of 
such transfer shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property for purposes of 
subsection (b) if the property and the income therefrom--(1) may be expended by, or for 
the benefit of, the donee before his attaining the age of 21 years, and (2) will to the extent 
not so expended-- (A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years, and (B) in 
the event the donee dies before attaining the age of 21 years, be payable to the estate of 
the donee or as he may appoint under a general power of appointment as defined in 
section 2514(c). 
27 Although commonly referred to as covering gifts to minors, ―minors‖ is already a misnomer as 
the age of majority is now 18 and not 21 when the statute provides for termination and payment to the donee.  
Yet, even trust termination and payout at age 21 does not  comport with the contemporary medical findings 
that young adults‘ brains are not completely formed until their mid-to-late twenties.  See, e.g., Tony Cox, 
Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years, NPR (Oct. 10, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=141164708 (interviewing Sandra Aamodt, neuroscientist and co-author of 
Welcome to Your Child's Brain: How the Mind Grows from Conception to College);  A. Rae Simpson, Brain 
Changes, MIT  YOUNG ADULT DEV. PROJECT (2008), available at http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/ 
brain.html#beyond (arguing that the brain is not fully developed until at least age 25). Thus, it is not 
surprising for donors today to be wary of creating these trusts and, consequently, this explains t he 
employment of techniques to minimize the actual termination and payout at age 21.  See DODGE, GERZOG, 
AND CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 129–31. 
28 See James Casner, American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, 22 TAX L. REV. 
515, 530 (1967) (―The most troublesome aspect of the requirements has been that the beneficiary be entitled 
to the principal and any accumulated income when he reaches 21 if the gift of principal is to qualify for the 
exclusion.‖). 
29 See Bridget J. Crawford, Reform the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion to Raise Revenue, 132 Tax Notes 
443 (July 25, 2011) (citing Rev. Rul. 74-43, 1974 C.B. 285) (―If the beneficiary has the right to withdraw all 
the trust property at age 21 but the trust continues if the beneficiary does not do so, the trust will still qualify 
for the annual exclusion.‖). 
30 I.R.C. § 2503(e) provides:  
(1) Any qualified transfer shall not be treated as a transfer of property by gift for purposes 
of this chapter.  (2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ―qualified transfer‖ means 
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an expanded section 2503(e) education exclusion that would cover ―qualified higher 
education expenses‖ (as defined in section 529) while the donee is attending post-
secondary school as, at least, a half-time student;
31
 (2) an exclusion that would cover 
reasonable living expenses (food, clothing, and lodging) of any donee living in the same 
residence as the donor, regardless of age;
32
 and (3) an exclusion that would apply to cash 
payments to any individual who provides care for a disabled person, including the donor, 
living in the donor‘s home as long as the payments bear a reasonable relationship to the 
services provided to the disabled person and all associated required state and federal 
employment and income taxes are timely paid.  While payments to non-relatives 
generally fall outside of the gift tax under the ―ordinary-course-of-business‖ exception in 
the gift tax regulations,
33
 payments to relatives who perform care for their disabled 
relatives have at times been construed as taxable gifts.
34
  The purpose of this added 
exclusion is to clarify under what circumstances payments to family and friend caregivers 
would be exempt from gift tax. 
The author understands that the consumption exclusions indirectly add to the 
transferee‘s wealth, either by adding to her human capital (the ability to make more 
money because of an advanced education) or by allowing her to preserve her financial 
capital instead of having to use her investments to pay for the value of her living costs.
35
  
However, comparable to the exclusion for services,
36
 consumption costs outlined in the 
proposed exclusion may be too elusive for most donors to consider their wealth transfer 
effect and, as such, produce administrative reasons not to subject those items to tax.  
                                                                                                                                     
any amount paid on behalf of an individual-- (A) as tuition to an educational organization 
described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education or training of such individual, or 
(B) to any person who provides medical care (as defined in section 213(d)) with respect 
to such individual as payment for such medical care. 
31 See I.R.C. § 25A(b)(3). 
32 This proposal is similar to but less restrictive than the one proposed by the American Law 
Institute (―ALI‖) in the 1960s.  See Casner, supra note 28, at 538 (Explaining an exclusion for transfers for 
current consumption cannot be one that results in the acquisition of property ―if it is an expenditure for: (1) 
The benefit of a minor child of the transferor; or (2) Educational costs or medical or dental costs of an 
individual; or (3) Food, clothing, and maintenance of living accommodations of an individual and persons 
dependent on such individual that does not exceed $3000 annually.‖). 
33 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (stating, in part: ―However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of 
property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm‘s length, and free 
from any donative intent), will be considered as made for a full and adequate consideration in money or 
money‘s worth.‖). 
34 Many cases involving the issue of whether a transfer is a bequest or a valid claim against the 
estate under I.R.C. § 2053 rest on presumptions under state law, which, when facts of an employment 
agreement are ambiguous, often presume services provided to family members to be gratuitous.  Having a 
clear exclusion may obviate the need for such litigation.  See e.g., Olivo v. Comm‘r, T.C.M. 2011-16 
(applying New Jersey law presumption); Estate of Wilson v. Comm‘r, T.C.M. 98-309 (finding payments by 
the executor to two brothers, distant relatives of the decedent‘s predeceased husband, who consecutively  
performed services for the decedent, elderly and suffering from severe diabetes and its consequences 
(blindness and leg amputation), were held to be for adequate consideration in money or money‘s worth).  In 
Wilson, the court upheld an oral compensation agreement because it found that the agreement was between 
nonrelatives who were not the natural objects of the decedent‘s bounty and, like unrelated third parties, were 
both service providers engaged the estate in litigation and settlement. 
35 See SURREY, supra note 21, at 696 (―. .  . [T]he payment of certain educational and medical 
expenses where the donor has no legal obligation to support the donee constitute transfers properly subject to 
tax.‖); Paul L. Caron, Taxing Opportunity, 14 VA. TAX REV. 347, 423 (1994) (advocating the limitation of the 
gift tax exemption for services to those that ―the parents do not provide to third parties.‖).  
36 See Comm’r v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947). 
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Additionally, there are non-tax reasons
37
 to allow some of these new exemptions: 
encouraging education
38
 and the care of disabled family members by family members,
39
 
especially with the dearth of caregivers nationwide.
40
 
Finally, a verifiable gift tax means better taxpayer compliance with the gift tax 
filing and payment requirements, which are increasingly ignored rather than timely 
satisfied.
41
  In their recent article,
42
 Professors Gans and Soled have noted the dismal 
compliance rate for gift tax returns due to the lack of consequences and enforcement tools 
in this area
43
 and have suggested the imposition of filing of mandatory donee information 
returns in order to confirm the information on the donor‘s required return44 and of new 
penalties on delinquent donors.
45
  While their arguments are convincing, this article 
proposes an alternative solution to what this author also sees as very real problems. 
As stated, there are benefits to making lifetime gifts.  Among those benefits are 
the unified credit (currently exempting $5.43 million when combined with the estate tax 
credit),
46
 the annual exclusion (both the current one and as modified under this 
proposal),
47
 and the gift tax tax-exclusive tax base.
48
  Adopting something like the 
                                                 
37 SURREY, supra note 21, at 696. 
38 See, e.g., 529 REPORT (Coll. Sav. Plans Network, Lexington, Ky.), Sep. 2014, Tax Analysts‘ 
Document Service, Doc. 2014-21949 (―Education is the key to unlocking the door to opportunity.  
Throughout the past several years, new research continues to provide supportive evidence that a college 
degree not only increases the economic earning power of both individuals and our national economy, but it is 
also proven to contribute to improved health, homeownership, voting rates, community volunteerism and 
other social benefits.‖). 
39 See National Family Caregiver Support Act, Pub. L. No. 106-501, 114 Stat. 2253 (2000) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3030s to 3030s-2 (2012)).  For information about sponsored programs, 
see Administration on Aging (AoA): National Family Caregiver Support Program (OAA Title IIIE), ADMIN. 
FOR CMTY. LIVING, U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. available at http://www.aoa.gov/ 
aoa_programs/hcltc/caregiver/index.aspx.  Under the income tax system, payments to relatives, as defined 
under I.R.C. § 152(d)(2)(A)–(G), for long term care for the ―chronically ill‖ are denied medical care 
deductions.  See I.R.C. §§ 213(d)(11), 7702B(c).  These are income tax issues and thus not within the scope 
of this article; however, this author would welcome a change in those provisions as well.  Abuse in this area 
can better be dealt with by requiring proper and timely income and work-related filing and tax payments in 
order to receive a deduction or other income tax benefit. 
40 See, e.g., Walt Zywiak, Global Inst. for Emerging Healthcare Practices, U.S. Healthcare 
Workforce Shortages: Caregivers, COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP . (May 2013), available at http:// 
assets1.csc.com/health_services/downloads/CSC_US_Healthcare_Workforce_Shortages_Caregivers.pdf. 
41 Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making it Enforceable, 78 B.U. L. 
REV. 759, 775 (2007) (noting that ―compliance with the gift tax appears to be ebbing.‖). 
42 Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making it Enforceable, 78 B.U. L. 
REV. 759 (2007). 
43 Id. at 776 (―When it comes to gift tax enforcement, however, the issuance of any third-party 
information returns is noticeably absent, and there is no self-policing mechanism in place.‖). 
44 Id. at 793–95 (suggesting a requirement of information returns and aggregated multiple gifts 
from individual information returns, aggregating multiple gifts, from individual donees for outright gifts and 
from trustees for transfers in trust). 
45 Id. at 795–96.  None of the penalties would be determined with reference to the taxpayer‘s actual 
gift tax liability because they would be computed without taking into account the credit exemption amount.  
Id.  The authors ask Congress ―to institute reporting mechanisms that facilitate IRS oversight and a penalty 
system that taxpayers will think twice about before violating.‖  Id. at 799. 
46 See I.R.C. § 2010.  Beginning with 2012, the $5 million exemption equivalent is indexed for 
inflation.  I.R.C. §  2010 (c)(3)(B).  In 2015, that indexed exemption equivalent is $5.43 million.  See Rev. 
Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860 § 3.33 (―For an estate of any decedent dying during calendar year 2015, 
the basic exclusion amount is $5,430,000 for determining the amount of the unified credit against estate tax 
under § 2010.‖). 
47 See infra Part IV. 





 in which the surviving spouse only receives the 
deceased spouse‘s unused exemption amount if a timely return is filed, this article 
proposes to deny one, two, or all of the gift tax benefits to a donor who is required to, but 
does not, file a gift tax return. 
                                                                                                                                     
48 The estate tax differs from the gift tax in that the estate tax, like the income tax, is a tax-inclusive 
tax.  See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 8, 46, 349 n.46.  That is, assets used to pay the 
estate tax liability are themselves subject to estate tax.  Id.  A benefit of the gift tax is that the money used to 
pay gift tax liability is not itself subject to gift or estate tax and yet it diminishes the donor‘s estate.  Id. 
49 The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 
§§ 302(a)(1) & 303(a), Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302–04, amended I.R.C. § 2010(c) by enacting 
a temporary ―portability‖ provision, applicable to decedents dying in 2011 and 2012, which allowed the 
deceased spousal unused exclusion amount to be applied to both the surviving spouse‘s gift and estate tax 
liabilities in addition to her own exemption amount.  See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 
290.  The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 § 101(a), Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013), made 
those portability provisions a permanent feature of estate taxation.  With the enactment of the portability 
provisions, § 2010(c)(2) defines the ―applicable exclusion amount‖ as aggregating the surviving spouse‘s 
―basic exclusion amount‖ with her ―deceased spousal unused exclusion amount.‖  The surviving spouse‘s 
additional exclusion amount is defined as ―the lesser of (A) the basic exclusion amount, or (B) the excess of– 
(i) the basic exclusion amount of the last such deceased spouse of such surviving spouse, over (ii) the amount 
with respect to which the tentative tax is determined under section 2001(b)(1) on the estate of such deceased 
spouse.‖  I.R.C. § 2010(c)(4).  On the topic of portability, SEE OUTSIDE THE BOX ON ESTATE TAX REFORM: 
REVIEWING IDEAS TO SIMPLIFY PLANNING: HEARINGS BEFORE THE S. FIN. COMM., 110TH CONG. 2 (2008) 
(TESTIMONY OF SHIRLEY M. KOVAR, CHAIR, TRANSFER TAX STUDY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
TRUST AND ESTATE COUNSEL); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX‘N, 110TH CONG., TAXATION OF WEALTH 
TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY: A DISCUSSION OF SELECTED AREAS FOR POSSIBLE REFORM, (Joint. Comm. Print 
2008); Bridget J. Crawford and Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Planning With Portability Do-Overs (But Only for a 
Limited Time), 143 TAX NOTES 117 (2014) (outlining the temporary relief in Rev. Proc. 2014-18, 2014-07 
I.R.B. 513); Bridget J. Crawford & Wendy C. Gerzog, Portability, Marital Wealth Transfers and the Taxable 
Unit, in CONTROVERSIES IN TAX LAW: A M ATTER OF PERSPECTIVE (Anthony C. Infanti, ed., forthcoming Apr. 
2015); Wendy C. Gerzog, Portability of Exemptions, 119 TAX NOTES 509 (2008) (discussing background 
material on portability); David Cay Johnston, Patches, Portability, and Punting Versus an Estate Tax KISS, 
125 TAX NOTES 249 (2009); Fred Stokeld, Senators, Witnesses Ponder Estate Tax Reform Options, 119 TAX 
NOTES 15 (2008). 
50 Under I.R.C. § 2010(c)(5)(A), a portability election is effective only if made on a Form 706 that 
is filed within the time prescribed by law (including extensions) for filing such return.  See Temp. Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2010–2T(a)(1) (2012), which provides: 
To allow a decedent's surviving spouse to take into account that decedent's deceased 
spousal unused exclusion (―DSUE‖) amount, the executor of the decedent's estate must 
elect portability of the DSUE amount on a timely -filed Form 706, ―. .  . Estate (and 
Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return‖. . . . Accordingly, the due date of an estate 
tax return required to elect portability is nine months after the decedent's date of death or 
the last day of the period covered by an extension (if an extension of time for filing has 
been obtained).  See §§20.6075-1 and 20.6081-1 for additional rules relating to the time 
for filing estate tax returns. 
Likewise, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 20.2010–2T(a)(3)(ii) provides: ―The executor of the estate of a decedent 
(survived by a spouse) will not make or be considered to make the portability election if . . . [t]he executor 
does not timely file an estate tax return in accordance with paragraph (a)(1) of this section.‖  These temporary 
regulations were added by T.D. 9593, 2012-28 I.R.B. 17, were published in 77 Fed. Reg. 36150, 36157–60 
on June 18, 2012, and are retroactively effective June 15, 2012.  The applicability of the Temporary 
Regulations expires on or before June 15, 2015.  Temp. Treas. Reg. § 20.2010-2T(f).  The American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (―AICPA‖) has recently proposed easing the filing requirements for 
portability for those not required to file an estate tax return because the decedent‘s estate is below the filing 
dollar threshold, allowing those estates to file a 706-EZ form and allowing the surviving spouse to make the 
portability election.  AICPA Letter to IRS on Portability Relief, AM. INST. OF CPAS (Mar. 19, 2015), available 
at http://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/Tax/DownloadableDocuments/ 
aicpa_comments_on_portability_relief_extend_request-3-19%2015-submitted-es.pdf. 
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To comply with the portability rules for estate tax purposes, in order to allow the 
surviving spouse to benefit from the first-spouse-to-die‘s unused ―unified credit‖ (by 
aggregating the decedent‘s unused credit amount with the surviving spouse‘s own credit 
exemption),
51
 even if the decedent is not subject to estate tax, the executor is required to 
file an estate tax return for the purpose of computing, and permitting the porting of, the 
deceased spouse‘s unused spousal exemption. 52  In sum, without timely and proper filing 
of an estate tax return for portability purposes, the surviving spouse loses a potentially 
hefty tax benefit.  Mirroring the portability requirement, denying sought-after gift tax 
preferences to non-filers should provide a sufficient and simple incentive for donor 
compliance. 
II. VALUATION DISTORTIONS 
Wealthy parents and grandparents create non-business entities, primarily FLPs 
and limited liability companies (―LLCs‖), in order to devalue the almost entirely liquid 
(and therefore undiscounted) assets they transfer to those entities.  Because the entity or 
state law imposes restrictions on the transferability of such entity interests, gifts of those 
interests are entitled to lack-of-marketability discounts.  The values of those gifts are also 
generally entitled to a minority (lack of control) discount because holders of those 
interests cannot freely control the entity‘s assets.53  Together, those discounts reduce the 






, the Tax Court merely required a showing of ―the existence of a 
legitimate and significant nontax reason for creating the family limited partnership, and 
[that] the transferors received partnership interests proportionate to the value of the 
property transferred.‖56 
Although urged by Judges Halpern and Laro in their separate opinions
57
 to focus, 
respectively, on the ordinary-course-of-business exception under the regulations
58
 and 
                                                 
51 See I.R.C. § 2010(c). 
52 See supra note 49. 
53 See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 484–99.  In addition, because the wealthy 
entity creators generally make gifts of minority interests in the entity and because, subsequent to that gift -
giving, the parents or grandparents hold a minority share in the entity at their deaths, minority interest 
discounts also apply to further decrease the value of any gifts or bequests.  Id. 
54 See Martha Britton Eller, Which Estates Are Affected by the Estate Tax?: An Examination of the 
Filing Population for Year-of-Death 2001, STATS. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 2005, at 185, 197,  rev. ed. 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01esyod.pdf (―According to IRS estate and gift tax attorneys, who 
review and audit Federal estate tax returns, and various private-sector studies of valuation discounting, recent 
discounts of FLP interests fall between 30 percent and 60 percent.‖). 
55 Estate of Bongard v. Comm‘r, 124 T.C. 95 (2005).  See Wendy C. Gerzog, Bongard’s Nontax 
Motive Test: Not Open and Schutt, 107 TAX NOTES 1711 (June 27, 2005).  The Bongard test is used to 
determine whether or not the ―bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration‖ exception under § 2036 
applies.  While § 2036 is an estate tax provision, the bona fide sale exception refers to the decedent‘s lifetime 
transfer. 
56 Bongard, 124 T.C. at 118.  According to the Tax Court, the nontax reason must be ―a significant 
factor that motivated the partnership‘s creation‖ and it ―must be an actual motivation, not a theoretical 
justification.‖  Id.  The family entity must also comply with the formal requirements of establishing a limited 
partnership or limited liability company and adhere to a proper sequence of events.  See Hurford v. Comm‘r, 
96 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (2008); Senda v. Comm‘r, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’g T.C.M. (RIA) 
2004-160. 
57 Judge Laro concurred in the result in Bongard.  124 T.C. at 133.  Judge Halpern concurred in 
part and dissented in part.  124 T.C. at 141. 
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similar case law,
59
 the Court rejected that analysis and diverged from gift tax basics and 
the primarily non-motive focus of the gift definition statute, which effectively inhibits 
abuse.
60
  The Court crafted its own two-prong approach, which unfortunately introduced 
motive as determinative
61
 and has improperly equated proportionality with the 
fundamental gift tax tenet that to avoid the transfer tax, there must be an equivalent 
exchange in money or money‘s worth.62  As a result, application of the court‘s Bongard 
test requires a fact-intensive inquiry with inconsistent and unpredictable results.
63
 
The Court in Bongard listed factors that demonstrated the lack of a nontax 
purpose: (1) the taxpayer stands on both sides of the transaction; (2) the taxpayer needs 
partnership distributions for his maintenance and support; (3) the partners commingle 
partnership assets with their own; and (4) the taxpayer does not transfer the property to 
the FLP.
64
  With such minimal requirements, some taxpayers have prevailed in asserting 
the following purported ―nontax motives‖: gift giving and estate planning 65 (including 
providing funds to pay the donor‘s gift tax or the decedent‘s estate tax liabilities),66 
creditor or asset protection,
67
 protection from property division in the event of a 
divorce,
68
 centralized asset management,
69
 maintaining and retaining family assets,
70
 
encouraging family harmony and reducing litigation expenses from family 
                                                                                                                                     
58 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (―However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in the 
ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm‘s length, and free from any donative 
intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full consideration in money or money‘s worth.‖); 
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (―The gift tax is not applicable to a transfer for a full and adequate 
consideration in money or money‘s worth, or to ordinary business transactions . . . .‖).  Judge Halpern 
criticized the majority‘s deviation from the regulations by imposing a motive test: ―By the explicit terms of 
section 25.2512-8, Gift Tax Regs., the resulting inquiry is limited to an economic calculus, and there is no 
room for any inquiry as to the transferor‘s (decedent‘s) state of mind.‖  Bongard, 124 T.C. at 144 (concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
59 Judge Laro maintained that the court should continue to apply the Gregory  v. Helvering, 293 
U.S. 465 (1935), business purpose test, cited by the Third Circuit in Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 
382 F.3d 367, 383 (3d Cir. 2004).  Bongard, 124 T.C. at 139 (concurring in result). 
60 Under I.R.C § 2512(b), a gift for gift tax purposes is defined as an unequal exchange in money or 
money‘s worth.  See Comm‘r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945) (holding that transfers out of love and 
affection are not consideration in money or money‘s worth).  Because the gift tax is concerned with transfers 
that result in a diminution of the donor‘s estate without imposing a gift tax, its focus differs from the test for a 
gift for income tax purposes, which, under Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), requires 
donative intent.  Indeed, the role of donative intent is minimal in gift tax law.  See Treas. Reg. 
§ 25.2511-1(g)(1) (―Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential element in the application 
of the gift tax to the transfer.‖). 
61 As Judge Halpern stated in Bongard, ―By the explicit terms of section 25.2512-8, Gift Tax Regs., 
the resulting inquiry is limited to an economic calculus, and there is no room for any inquiry as to the 
transferor‘s (decedent‘s) state of mind.‖  124 T.C. at 144 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
62 Id. at 145 (―While an inquiry as to proportionality may have some bearing on whether the 
transfer was in the ordinary course of business, within the meaning of section 25.2512-8, Gift Tax Regs. (e.g., 
was at arm‘s length), I fail to see how proportionality aids the inquiry as to whether the value of the property 
transferred exceeded the cash value of the consideration received in exchange.‖) (footnote omitted). 
63 See Wendy C. Gerzog, Tax Court FLP Confusion: Mirowski, 120 TAX NOTES 263 (July 21, 
2008). 
64 124 T.C. at 118–19. 
65 See Estate of Schutt v. Comm‘r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353 (2005). 
66 Estate of Mirowski v. Comm‘r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1277 (2008). 
67 See Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 268 (5th Cir. 2004), vacating 244 F. Supp. 2d 700 
(N.D. Tex. 2003); Mirowski, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1277. 
68 See Kimbell, 371 F.3d 257. 
69 See id.; Mirowski, T.C.M. (CCH) 1277; Schutt, T.C.M. (CCH) 1353. 
70 See Schutt, T.C.M. (CCH) 1353. 
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disagreements,
71
 investment education for the family and the family‘s children and 
grandchildren,
72
 providing for children equally,
73
 reducing family members‘ probate 
costs,
74
 and consolidating fractional interests in family assets.
75
 
The Obama administration has proposed measures to eliminate family entity non-
marketability
76
 discounts, but thus far none has been enacted into law.  The focus of the 
budget proposals is to diminish the use of marketability discounts in family entities by 
creating ―a more robust version of section 2704(b).‖77  However, these proposals do not 
address the elimination of minority discounts.
78
  Also, by leaving many of the specific 
                                                 
71 See Kimbell, 371 F.3d 257; Stone v. Comm‘r, T.C.M. 2003-309. 
72 See Kimbell, 371 F.3d 257. 
73 See Mirowski, T.C.M. (CCH) 2008-74. 
74 See Kimbell, 371 F.3d 257. 
75 Id. 
76 The Obama administration‘s Budget Proposals from 2010 through 2013 included the following 
proposed change to §2704(b), although those proposals have not yet been enacted into law: 
The proposal modifies section 2704(b) to create a category of ‗disregarded restrictions‘ 
that would be ignored when valuing an interest in a family -controlled entity transferred to 
a member of the family if, after the transfer, the restriction will lapse or may be removed 
by the transferor and/or the transferor‘s family. . . .  The proposal provides that 
disregarded restrictions would include limitations on a holder‘s right to liquidate that 
holder‘s interest in the family -controlled entity that are more restrictive than a standard to 
be specified in regulations. A disregarded restriction also would include a limitation on a 
transferee‘s ability to be admitted as a full partner or holder of an equity interest in the 
entity. . . . Such interests are to be identified in regulations. Under the proposal, 
regulatory authority is granted, including the ability to create safe harbors under which 
the governing documents of a family-controlled entity could be drafted so as to avoid the 
application of section 2704 if certain standards are met. 
See STAFF ON JOINT COMM. ON TAX‘N, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN 
THE PRESIDENT‘S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL—PART ONE: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX AND ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAX PROVISIONS, at 140-42 (Joint Comm. Print 2009), available at https://www.jct.gov/ 
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3573 [hereinafter 2010 Budget Proposal].  The budget proposal 
indicates that the Administration wants to reduce non-marketability discounts in family entities, but it leaves 
to the Treasury the specific areas of abuse that need to be remedied.  However, the proposal indicates that 
whatever restrictions are to be disregarded would apply retroactively to October 8, 1990 (the effective date of 
section 2704).  Dept. of the Treas., General Explanations of the Administration‘s Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue 
Proposals, at 121 (May 2009); Dept. of the Treas., General Explanations of the Administrations Fiscal Year 
2011 Revenue Proposals, at 124 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2011.pdf; Dept. of the Treas., General Explanations of the 
Administrations Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue Proposals 127 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2012.pdf; Dept. of the Treas., General 
Explanations of the Administrations Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals 260, at 268 (Feb. 2012), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/documents/general-explanations-fy2013.pdf (―The 
proposal was contained in the President‘s budget proposals for fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012.‖).  See 
Ronald D. Aucutt, The Obama Administration‘s Revenue Proposals, Capital Letter No. 17 (Sep. 30, 2009), 
available at http://www.actec.org/public/capitalletter17.asp  (―The proposal is estimated to raise revenue by 
$19.038 billion over the ten fiscal years from 2010 through 2019.  The estimate of $667 million of additional 
revenue for fiscal 2010, which ends September 30, 2010, necessarily assumes that enactment will occur early 
enough to catch a substantial number of transfers in calendar 2009.‖). 
77 2010 Budget Proposal, supra note 76, at 142. 
78 2010 Budget Proposal, supra note 76, at 144 (―Although the Administration‘s budget proposal 
considers family relationships in determining whether a restriction on liquidation could be removed for 
purposes of section 2704(b), it does not include a family attribution rule that addresses the inappropriate use 
of minority discounts where family members control an entity.  Some may argue, however, that such a family 
attribution rule would be inappropriate, because it is not correct to assume that individuals always will 
cooperate with one another merely because they are related.‖); see Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, 
Revitalizing the Estate Tax: 5 Easy Pieces, 142 Tax Notes 1231, 1232-34 (Mar. 17, 2014) available at http:// 
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―disregarded restrictions‖ to the Treasury to define in regulations, the proposals are 






The simpler gift tax would streamline the transfer tax valuation of most family 
entities by ignoring the family entity and valuing the underlying assets transferred to 
those entities.  With traditional gift tax precepts, however, the simpler gift tax would 
exempt family entities that operate businesses as long as the transferred assets are 
customary in kind and extent to similar non-family operating business entities.
81
  There 
would be no motive inquiry,
82
 just the economic equivalence test in, and the ordinary-
course-of-business exception of, current gift tax law.  With the goal of simplifying the 
transfer tax system, these changes may be more politically palatable. 
III. GIFT COMPLETION RULES 
Under current law, the rules for gift completion are found in Regulation 
§ 25.2511-2.  They begin with a clear focus: the central tenet of gift completion is the 
donor‘s relinquishment of the transferred property, regardless of whether the donee‘s 
identity is known.
83
  A donor makes a completed gift when he ―has so parted with 
dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition, whether for 
his own benefit or for the benefit of another . . . .‖84  The regulation should have stopped 
                                                                                                                                     
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410985 [hereinafter Carson & Repetti] (proposing to 
eliminate minority discounts when the transferred entity or asset continues to be controlled by the transferor 
or certain family members). 
79 Revenue collected from federal transfer taxes, particularly from gift taxes, is very low as 
compared to revenue derived from the federal income tax.  See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 
222 (3d ed. 1977) (―Despite the appeal of estate and gift taxes on social, moral, and economic grounds, taxes 
on property transfers have never provided significant revenues in this country.‖).  Even with the preferences 
for gifts, taxpayers generally do not fully take advantage of them.  See id. at 231-32 (―The figures . . . show 
clearly that wealthy people prefer to retain the bulk of their property until death and fail to use gifts to 
maximum tax-saving advantage.  There are a number of reasons for the small proportion of gifts.  First, most 
people are reluctant to contemplate death.  Uncertainty regarding time of death encourages delay in making 
estate plans even by those with considerable wealth.  Second, many wish to retain control over their 
businesses.  Disposal of stock or real estate frequently means loss of control over substantial enterprises.  
Third, donors may wish to delay transfers of property until their children have had an opportunity to make 
their own careers.  Fourth, many people—even those who are wealthy—do not know the law and often do not 
take the advice of their tax lawyers on such personal matters.‖). 
80 From the elimination of minority discounts, the Administration‘s estimate is $18.1 billion over 
the next ten years.  SEE JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42959, THE ESTATE AND GIFT TAX 
PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 2012, at 6 (2013) (discussing the Administration‘s 
FLP proposal within the Minority Discounts section), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R42959.pdf.  
81 See Caron & Repetti, supra note 78, at 1234 (rejecting a family business exception to their 
proposal). 
82 That is, there would be no motive inquiry except to the extent that the regulations define the 
ordinary course of business exception as being ―free from any donative intent.‖  See Treas. Reg. §25.2512-8. 
83 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a). 
84 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b).  A purely administrative power subject to fiduciary restraints is not 
considered a retained power either under current transfer tax rules or under the proposed simpler gift tax.  See 
Casner, supra note 28, at 547 (―[A] problem is presented as to whether certain administrative powers are to 
be regarded as powers to determine who takes under the transfer.  Even if broadly stated, basically 
administrative powers should not be so regarded, if under the controlling local law the trustee is subject to 
fiduciary standards in their exercise.‖). 
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More significantly, the remainder of the regulation parses unsatisfying 
distinctions and creates inconsistency with the estate tax provisions covering identical 
types of transfers.  For example, it makes sense that if the donor retains the power to 
name new beneficiaries, the gift is not complete; however, it is unclear why the 
regulation does not view the donor‘s retained power over the timing of the donee‘s 
receipt of the gift in the same light.
88
  Why is the retained control over timing insufficient 
to negate the transfer of the donor‘s control?  If, as donee, I may have to wait fifty years 
or more to receive the property (although I may receive it earlier at the donor‘s whim), 
how has the donor relinquished sufficient control over the property to indicate she has 
surrendered ownership of the property?  Under the estate tax provisions, if one retains 
control over the timing of beneficial enjoyment of transferred property, the property is 
thereby in the donor‘s estate.89  Thus, the conflict with the estate tax rules indicates she 
has not transferred such ownership. 
Likewise, the gift tax rule for joint retained control under the regulation
90
 
effectuates a completed gift that, under the estate tax rules, is subject to estate tax 
inclusion.
91
  The gift tax rule concerning the donor‘s retention of a power jointly with 
another requires that the other power holder be someone who has a ―substantial adverse 
interest‖92 to the donor‘s exercise of her power in order for the gift to be complete.  The 
rationale is that self-interest will make the joint power holder reluctant to allow the donor 
to exercise her power,
93
 but the estate tax rule requires estate tax inclusion if the donor 
retains at her death a power jointly with anyone.  While the gift tax motivation-based 
principle may or may not be appropriate (since the wealthy donor likely has more power 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d) (―A gift is not considered incomplete. . . .‖ (emphasis 
added)). 
86 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (―Thus, if an estate for life is transferred but, by an exercise 
of a power, the estate may be terminated or cut down by the donor to one of less value, and without 
restriction upon the extent to which the estate may be so cut down, the transfer constitutes an incomplete 
gift.‖). 
87 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (―For example, if a donor transfers property to another in trust to pay 
the income to the donor or accumulate it in the discretion of the trustee, and the donor retains a testamentary 
power to appoint the remainder among his descendants, no portion of the transfer is a completed gift.  On the 
other hand, if the donor had not retained the testamentary power of appointment, but instead provided that the 
remainder should go to X or his heirs, the entire transfer would be a completed gift.  However, if the exercise 
of the trustee‘s power in favor of the grantor is limited by a fixed or ascertainable standard . . . , enforceable 
by or on behalf of the grantor, then the gift is incomplete to the extent of the ascertainable value of any rights 
thus retained by the grantor.‖). 
88 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (retained power to add a new beneficiary); Treas. Reg. 
§ 25.2511-2(d) (retained power to affect timing of beneficial enjoyment).  
89 See Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953). 
90 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e) provides that ―[a] donor is considered as himself having a power if it 
is exercisable by him in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the 
disposition of the transferred property or the income therefrom.‖ 
91 See Camp v. Comm’r, 195 F.2d 999 (1st Cir. 1952). 
92 As defined in the income tax grantor provisions, a ―substantial adverse interest‖ refers to a 
beneficiary‘s economic interest in the trust that would make him unlikely to join in on a decis ion to diminish 
his own financial interest.  Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-1(a) (1960); see e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-1(b) (―Thus, if 
A, B, C, and D are equal income beneficiaries of a trust and the grantor can revoke with A's consent, the 
grantor is treated as the owner of a portion which represents three-fourths of the trust; and items of income, 
deduction, and credit attributable to that portion are included in determining the tax of the grantor.‖). 
93 See Camp, 195 F.2d at 1004-05. 
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to control lifetime decisions over the exercise of a joint power), the estate tax rule is a 
much simpler rule.  Therefore, the simpler gift tax would allow the gift tax rule to 
conform to estate tax law. 
Under the current gift tax rules, a gift of a contingent interest to third parties is a 
completed gift,
94
 valued to reflect the risk of loss,
95
 and not subject to estate tax.  
However, if § 2702
96
 applies to a transfer with a contingent reversionary interest, that 
interest will have zero value and the undiscounted value of the property is subject to gift 
tax.  By contrast, under the simpler gift tax, if the donor retains any interest in the 
property, even a contingent interest, it is an incomplete gift of the donor‘s whole 
ownership interest.
97
  The simpler gift tax is more comprehensible than the present rules 
                                                 
94 See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943) (holding that the gift tax reaches gifts of 
―property, however conceptual or contingent‖); see also Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330 (1984).  Where 
gifts are subject to the condition that they will not be subject to gift tax, the condition subsequent is void as 
contrary to public policy.  See Comm’r v. Proctor, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).  Gifts subject to the donee‘s 
payment of gift tax are net gifts computed by subtracting the gift tax as partial consideration for the gift.  See 
Diedrich v. Comm’r, 457 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding that in terms of a net gift, the donor realizes gain where 
the amount of the gift tax paid exceeds the donor‘s basis in the property). 
95 See, e.g., Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 310 n.11 (―As the Tax Court noted in this case: ‗The 
value of petitioner‘s remainder interest was not, of course, equal to 50 percent of the value of the trust corpus.  
Rather, it depended upon actuarial factors reflecting the various contingencies.‘‖ (quoting Jewett v. Comm‘r, 
70 T.C. 430, 435 n.3)). 
96 I.R.C. § 2702 was enacted as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 (―The 1990 Tax 
Act‖).  Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 11601-02(a), 104 Stat. 1388-400, 1490-91 (1990).  (The 1990 Tax Act added 
§§ 2701–04 (Chapter 14) to the Internal Revenue Code.  I.R.C. § 2702 applies to transfers to ―a member of 
the transferor‘s family‖ (i.e., the donor‘s spouse, his (or his spouse‘s) ancestor or lineal descendant (or their 
spouses), or his sibling (or his sibling‘s spouse) where the transferor or ―applicable family member‖ (i.e., the 
transferor‘s spouse, his ancestor, or his ancestor‘s spouse) retains an interest in a trust or in property treated 
as if held in a trust.).  I.R.C. §§ 2702(e)), 2704(c)(2), 2701(e)(2), 2702(c)(1), 2702(a)(3)(ii) (2012); Treas. 
Reg. § 25.2702-5.  For current transfers with retained contingent reversions, the completed gift is generally 
valued at its full value without any reduction for the possibility that the property could revert to the donor.  
See I.R.C. § 2702 (2012) (providing that unless the retained interest is a ―qualified interest,‖ the donor‘s 
retained interest will be valued at zero); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702- 3(f)(iii) (―[A]n interest is non-contingent only 
if it is payable to the beneficiary or the beneficiary‘s estate in all events.‖).  Where a donor transfers property 
subject to alternate contingencies that cover all logical possible events or conditions, although she retains a 
reversionary interest at law, even without the application of I.R.C. § 2702, the donor‘s retained interest in 
such a case would be valueless under current gift tax rules. 
97 Let us examine the difference between the following two transfers in terms of donor-retained 
control: (1) a donor who retains the power to change the relative income interests of two third-party 
beneficiaries, which under the regulation is not a completed gift because of too much donor-retained control; 
and (2) a donor who sets different percentage ownership interests in trust income as between two third-party 
beneficiaries depending on calculations derived by multiple contingencies provided by the donor when the 
trust was established.  We can assume the multiple contingencies are the typical reasons a donor might want 
to change the percentage ownership between the two third-parties (e.g., marriage, divorce, employment, 
school, support needs, other assets, illegal activities, etc.).  In the first situation, the donor can change 
interests capriciously, for any reason, or for no reason at all.  In the second situation, the donor may only 
change the parties‘ percentage ownership for the reasons stated at the time of the transfer.  Otherwise, the two 
transfers are virtually identical.  The current gift tax rules treat the two transfers differently and so would the 
simpler gift tax.  These comparisons parallel the questionable differences between a general power of 
appointment and a special power of appointment.  As Professor Griswold stated, ―Any power can very easily 
be made a special power without materially limiting the [holder‘s] freedom of choice.‖  Erwin N. Griswold, 
Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARV. L. REV. 929, 957 (1939).  See also Joseph M. 
Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 325 (1988) (―The 
definition of general power under current law is unsatisfactory insofar as it exempts a power to withdraw 
corpus limited by standards relating to ‗support,‘ ‗maintenance,‘ ‗health,‘ and ‗education.‘  In practice, the 
‗standards‘ exception has the effect of making the incidence of 2041 elective among the cognoscenti.‖ 
(citations omitted)). 
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for gift completion: A donor makes a completed gift when he has so parted with 
dominion and control as to leave in him no power or interest in the transferred property.  
The new rule is blunt, uncomplicated, and is consistent with the estate tax rules.  
Therefore, gift completion only occurs during lifetime with respect to donor retained 
control or interests if the donor relinquishes all of those powers or interests more than 
three years before his death.
98
 
While adopting a hard-to-complete rule may reduce the number of gifts, 2009 
data shows that reduction would be limited.  In 2009, almost two-thirds of reported gifts 
were outright transfers,
99
 and approximately half of taxable and nontaxable gifts 
consisted of cash, which when added to gifts of real estate and stock, totaled more than 
eighty percent of reported gifts for the year.
100
  Any revenue loss, may also be 
counteracted by the greater understanding of the advantages of gift giving brought about 
by enacting and publicizing the benefits of the simpler gift tax. 
Because § 2702 would be repealed as unnecessary under the simpler gift tax, 
strategies such as short-term zeroed-out GRATs
101
 (and their concomitant revenue loss) 
would disappear.
102
  For a zeroed-out GRAT, the retained annuity is calculated to be 
valued at the same value or close to the same value, if intending to effect a small gift
103—
as the remainder interest passing to third parties.  Generally, only one asset is placed in 
the GRAT in order to avoid tainting a highly appreciating asset.  Finally, the term is 
short, like the two-year term in Walton, in order to reduce the chance that the donor might 
die during the term.  Should death occur, the estate tax provisions would tax the full date-
of-death value of the trust, and the donor would lose all of the tax benefits associated 
with the GRAT strategy; therefore, a short period of risk is desirable.  By employing this 
planning device, if the trust asset appreciates more than the calculated actuarial value, 
any excess value passes to the third parties free of transfer tax (i.e., the extra value would 
not be reached by either the gift or the estate tax — the latter effect occurring because of 
the benefit of the easy-to-complete gift tax rule of § 2702). 
Many scholars have decried the tax avoidance from the use of GRATs.
104
  In 
addition, President Obama‘s revenue proposals have included GRAT reform. 105  
                                                 
98 For relinquishments within three years of the donor‘s death, I.R.C. § 2035 would apply to include 
those transfers in decedent‘s estate.  Id. § 2035 (2012). 
99 Melissa J. Belvedere, 2009 Gifts, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL. 143 (Spring 2012) (―Most [2009] 
gifts (67.3 percent, or $25.5 billion) were given directly, meaning that recipients immediately had full use and 
enjoyment of the gifts.  Gifts through trust, where the donee‘s use of the gift is controlled by a trustee, 
accounted for the remaining 32.7 percent ($12.4 billion) of the gifts.‖ (internal reference omitted)). 
100 Id. (―Most gifts were in the form of cash which represented 47.5 percent ($18 billion) of total 
gifts.  Cash represented the largest share of gift amounts reported on both taxable and nontaxable returns.  
Gifts of real estate and stock made up the second and third largest shares of total gifts, 18.4 percent and 16.2 
percent of the total, respectively.‖ (internal reference omitted)). 
101 This technique was at least tacitly approved by the Tax Court in Walton v. Commissioner, 115 
T.C. 589 (2000), and acquiesced to by the government in Notice 2003-72, 2003-2 C.B. 964.  See discussion, 
supra note 15. 
102 Qualified Personal Residence Trusts (―QPRTs‖) would likewise be useless under the simpler 
gift tax.  And, even though this article does not discuss the transfer tax or income tax charitable deduction, 
CLATs, NIOCRUTs, and NIMCRUTs could also be eliminated if rules similar to the simpler gift tax applied 
with equal force to charitable gifts. 
103 Some estate planners recommend creating a small taxable gift so that the statute of limitations 
period would begin to run on the transfer.  See DODGE, GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 452 n.83. 
104 See, e.g., Caron & Repetti, supra note 78, at 1240 (proposing a lifetime limit on GRATs); Gans 
& Soled, supra note 41 at 789–90 (proposing to treat GRATs and QPRTs as incomplete gifts until the 
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Specifically, the Administration‘s proposal mandates a minimum ten-year term for a 
GRAT.  That would increase the risk of § 2036 exposure, which, if the donor died within 
the lengthened trust term, would subject the trust property to estate tax.
106
  This measure 
would eliminate the Walton short-term (two-year) zeroed-out GRAT and would increase 
the chance of that device creating an estate tax transfer rather than a preferred gift tax 
transfer—effectively imposing a hard-to-complete rule.  The President‘s GRAT proposal 
was estimated to increase revenue by $3.6 billion over a ten-year period.
107
 
Finally, the simpler gift tax would eliminate the current freebie known as the five 
or five power rule under § 2514(e).
108
  Section 2514(e) exempts from gift tax
109
 a lapse 
(as distinct from an exercise or release) of the power
110
 in stating that a lapse will not be 
considered a release, which would cause the property to be subject to gift tax
111
 to the 
extent that the value of the property subject to the donee holder‘s general power to 
withdraw funds from the trust does not exceed the greater of $5,000 or five percent of the 
aggregate value of the property subject to the power.  That is, in each year the donee 
power holder allows his power over the statutorily de minimis amount of property to 
lapse, he would not be making a gift of future interest to the remainder beneficiary of the 
trust.
112
  Although he is a donee because he did not create the trust for his benefit, he is 
                                                                                                                                     
grantor‘s interest terminates or, at the taxpayer‘s option, to tax the full value of the property paid to the trust 
(instead of only the remainder value)). 
105 The Joint Committee on Taxation proposed imposing a minimum ten-year term requirement for 
a GRAT.  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX‘N, 111th Cong., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED 
IN THE PRESIDENT‘S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL—PART ONE: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX AND ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAX PROVISIONS 149 (Joint Comm. Print 2009). 
106 I.R.C. § 2036(a) provides as follows:  
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any 
interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a 
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by 
trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not 
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end 
before his death -- (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the 
property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the 
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property  or the income therefrom. 
107 See GRAVELLE, supra note 80, at 6. 
108 I.R.C. § 2514(e) was enacted in 1951.  See Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 
82-58, 65 Stat. 91 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 343.  This Code section provides as follows:  
The lapse of a power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, during the life of the 
individual possessing the power shall be considered a release of such power.  The rule of 
the preceding sentence shall apply with respect to the lapse of powers during any 
calendar year only to the extent that the property which could have been appointed by 
exercise of such lapsed powers exceeds in value the greater of the following amounts: (1) 
$5,000, or (2) 5 percent of the aggregate value of the assets out of which, or the proceeds 
of which, the exercise of the lapsed powers could be satisfied. 
109 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) provides the same exemption from estate taxation.  I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) 
(2012). 
110 Essentially, a lapse requires inaction.  For an explanation of the interplay between a five or five 
power and the annual exclusion, including a discussion of a ―hanging power,‖ see DODGE, GERZOG & 
CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 135–36. 
111 Additionally, the estate tax equivalent provision prevents inclusion in the donee power holder‘s 
estate.  See I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2). 
112 Moreover, the donee power holder could continue to receive the income from that amount and 
not have any property included in his estate under I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2), which parallels §§ 2035–38 for 
general power of appointment holders.  See I.R.C. §§ 2035–2038, 2041(a)(2).  Without a lapse instead of an 
exercise or release, inclusion in decedent‘s gross estate is determined under Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2041-3(d)(3)-(5).  See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(3)–(5). 
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also rendered a donor by not taking money out of the trust as he is able to do by 
exercising his withdrawal power; by leaving the money in the trust, he becomes a donor 
to the remainder beneficiary who receives those additional amounts.  Estate planners 
typically restrict the time for exercising the five or five power to ensure that it is likely to 
―lapse.‖  As is readily apparent, this Code provision and related computations are 
complex. 
Although use of this de minimis exclusion is very common today in estate 
planning,
113
 it does not serve any valid purpose
114
 and is inconsistent with fundamental 
transfer tax rules.  In enacting this gift and estate tax exemption, Congress codified the 
then common practice of allowing a beneficiary to withdraw small sums so long as he did 
not make such a withdrawal on the rationale that other income beneficiaries were 
―unsophisticated‖ and needed such a fallback provision. 115  However, as a representative 
from the American Bar Association (―ABA‖) countered: 
[D]onees in small communities or with general powers over small funds, 
who did not have access to competent legal advice, either might not learn 
of the existence or nature of their powers or might not be properly 




In 1988, the ABA urged repeal of this exemption.
117
 
Essentially, because of its complexity and lack of a defensible policy rationale, 
the power of appointment five or five exception would not be included in the simpler gift 
tax. 
                                                 
113 The popularity of the combination of providing for both a five or five power and a Crummey 
annual exclusion withdrawal power is clear.  See, e.g., ABA Sec. of Tax‘n Task Force on Transfer Tax 
Restructuring, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 395, 412 (1988) [hereinafter ABA Sec. of 
Tax‘n Task Force] (―This ‗five-and-five‘ exception and the resulting Crummey problem discussed above may 
be routinely exploited by some sophisticated taxpayers.‖). 
114 See George Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 65 HARV. L. REV. 55, 78 (1951).  It 
appears that the provision was merely enacted to reflect current trust provision practice: ―Prior to the 1942 
Act it was quite common for a testator in his will to give a noncumulative power of invasion of principal in a 
small amount each year to his widow or children, and it is quite likely that this practice will be revived.‖  Id.  
At the time of this rule‘s enactment, it was unclear how popular this devise would become: ―It is too early to 
know just what use will be made of the provisions which exempt the first $5,000 or 5% of a trust fund over 
which a power lapses during the lifetime of the donee.‖  Id. 
115 See S. COMM. ON FIN., S. REP . NO. 82-382, at 5 (1951), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. (1951 Stat.) 
1530, 1535–36 (―Since the problem of the termination or lapse of powers of appointment during life arises 
primarily in the case of dispositions of moderate-sized properties where the donor is afraid the income will be 
insufficient for the income beneficiary and therefore gives the income beneficiary a noncumulative invasion 
power, it is believed that the exemption provided in the committee amendment ($5,000 or 5 percent of the 
principal) will be adequate to cover the usual cases without being subject to possible abuse.‖).  See also 
Craven, supra note 114, at 77.  In fact, however, this provision has been of greater service to sophisticated 
taxpayers who do hire attorneys to avoid wealth transfer taxes.  See ABA Sec. of Tax‘n Task Force, supra 
note 113. 
116 Craven, supra note 114, at 63. 
117 See ABA Sec. of Tax‘n Task Force, supra note 113, at 412 (―There is no conceptual justification 
for that exception.‖); Amy Morris Hess, The Federal Taxation of Nongeneral Powers of Appointment, 52 
TENN. L. REV. 395, 429 (1985) (arguing that the five or five power exception is ―simply an obvious example 
of the propensity of Congress to draft transfer tax statutes that exclude from taxation the most common forms 
of wealth transmission and tax only the unusual ones.‖). 
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IV. TAX PREFERENCES FOR CURRENT LIFETIME GIFTS 
Subsequent to unification by the 1976 Tax Act,
118
 there remain six benefits to 
making gifts: (1) the de minimis and consumption exclusions under section 2503;
119
 (2) 
the non-taxation of the funds used to pay the gift tax (its ―tax-exclusive‖ base);120 (3) gift-
splitting;
121
 (4) the ability to freeze the value of a gift early in the taxpayer‘s lifetime so 
that post-gift excess appreciation (increased future value that outpaces inflation) is not 
taxed;
122
 (5) the ability to transfer post-gift income to a lower bracket donee, often 
rendering the gift partly or wholly exempt from gift tax;
123
 and (6) the ability to make 
non-taxable additional gifts by creating an Intentionally Defective Grantor Trust 
(―IDGT‖),124 through which the grantor can make a completed gift of the trust property, 
but continue to pay the income tax liability on the donee‘s post-gift income, without 
incurring any additional gift tax. 
Rationales for gift tax preferences include: (1) the ability to generate current 
revenue;
125
 (2) the creation of discounts to equalize gratuitous transfers made at different 
times in the taxpayer‘s life;126 (3) gifts, more than bequests, contribute to a decline in 
wealth concentration;
127
 (4) pragmatic reasons;
128
 and (5) gifts place property in the hands 
                                                 
118 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
119 I.R.C. § 2503(b), (e). 
120 See discussion, supra note 48. 
121 I.R.C. § 2513. 
122 George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 161, 243 (1977) [hereinafter Cooper] (―The ALI report does not grapple with these questions 
because it proceeds from the convenient assumption that they are not really very important once the estate 
and gift tax is unified with a single rate scale. . . .  More significantly, [the ALI report] brushes aside estate 
freezing as if it were not even an issue. . . .  [T]he easy -to-complete-gift approach is disturbingly 
inadequate.‖).  However, from an income tax perspective, see Dodge Deemed Realization, supra note 1 at 
463-64 (―The government‘s interest under either a carryover-basis or a deemed-realization system would 
favor an easy-to-complete rule, so as to reduce the pool of property qualifying for upward basis 
adjustments.‖). 
123 A gift would not be subject to gift tax, for example, if the value of the gift fell below the credit 
equivalent amount or the annual exclusion amount.  Otherwise, any income tax advantage would be 
diminished or supplanted by the gift tax disadvantage.  That is, the gift tax is generally viewed as preventing 
wide-scale income shifting.  See William C. Brown, Judicial Expansion of the Future Interest Exception to 
the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion—Examination of the Legislative History and Policy Basis for the Future 
Interest Exception, 65 TAX LAW. 477, 481 (2012) [hereinafter Brown] (The gift tax ―also serves to discourage 
income shifting from high bracket taxpayers to low bracket taxpayers under the progressive rate structure of 
the federal income tax.‖). 
124 An IDGT avoids additional gifts where the donor makes a gift in trust that is a completed gift 
for gift tax purposes, but under the grantor trust rules (I.R.C. §§ 671-77) she is still liable for paying income 
taxes on the trust income.  See Daniel L. Ricks, I Dig It, But Congress Shouldn’t Let Me: Closing the IDGT 
Loophole, 36 ACTEC L. J. 641 (2010). 
125 See Cooper, Ghosts of 1932, supra note 21; David Joulfaian, Gift Taxes and Lifetime Transfers: 
Time Series Evidence, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 1917, 1919 (2004) [hereinafter Joulfaian]. 
126 See Joulfaian, supra note 125, at 1919 (―The benefit to the wealthy from such acceleration is 
that paying the gift tax would be equivalent to prepaying the estate tax, but at a significant discount.‖); See 
Jerome Kurtz & Stanley S. Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposal, the 
Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1390-391 (1970) [hereinafter Kurtz & Surrey] (―The 
only way to provide for an equitable encouragement of gifts is to adopt a unified transfer tax system with 
gross-up for lifetime transfers and then allow some percentage discount in the rate applicable to gifts as 
compared to death transfers.‖). 
127 PECHMAN, supra note 79, at 233 (―It is argued, in fact, that gifts tend to reduce the concentration 
of wealth by dispersing property among a relatively large number of donees.‖).  
128 See 1 Dept. of Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity and Economic Growth, 376 (Nov. 
1984) [hereinafter Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity] (―Notwithstanding the policies supporting full 
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of the young who invest in riskier holdings.
129
  Reasons to eliminate these preferences 
include: (1) the further unification of gift and estate taxes;
130
 (2) gift tax preferences 
unfairly favor the richest donors who are less likely to require all of their property to 
satisfy their future needs;
131
 (3) the government should not interfere with the timing of 
family wealth transfers,
132
 and (4) the argument that transfers to younger generations 
encourage more diversified investments is unsupported and inaccurate, particularly for 
gifts made in trust.
133
 
The Treasury‘s 1984 Tax Reform Proposals included a proposal to further unify 
the gift and estate taxes: the gift tax, like the estate tax, would be a tax inclusive tax; that 
is, funds that are used to pay the gift tax would, as with estate tax and income tax, 
                                                                                                                                     
unification of the estate and gift taxes, significant tax incentives remain for individuals to make lifetime gifts.  
Arguably, some of these tax advantages are justifiable because of practical considerations.  For example, the 
$10,000 annual exclusion from gift tax is often justified as a threshold for application of the tax because of 
the compliance and administrative problems that otherwise would be created.  The application of the same 
progressive rate schedule to all transfers, without adjustment for post -transfer appreciation in the value of the 
property, may also be justified because of simplicity and because a lifetime transfer deprives the donor of the 
use of the property and the use of any money used to pay gift tax on the transfer.‖). 
129 See Kurtz & Surrey, note 126 supra, at 1390 (―The argument usually advanced to support tax 
incentives for lifetime gifts is that it is to the advantage of the government to have property moved into 
younger hands, for the young will tend to be more venturesome with such capital and thus improve the 
economic climate by increasing the mobility and risk-taking capacity of that capital.‖); see also note 133, 
infra. 
130 See Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity, supra note 128, at 145 (Nov. 1984) (―Perhaps the most 
significant of these proposals is to complete the unification of the estate and gift tax systems by conforming 
the computation of the gift tax base to that of the estate tax. . . . Together, these changes will assure that the 
form of ownership and transfer of assets within a family will play a greatly reduced role in determining the 
transfer taxes paid by that family.‖).  The 1976 Tax Act unified the gift and estate tax rates and exemptions 
and made gifts and bequests part of the same cumulative rate structure for estate tax purposes.  See DODGE, 
GERZOG & CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 42-43, 449; SURREY, supra note 21, at 56.  But, some preferences 
for gifts remain.  PECHMAN, supra note 79, at 231 (citing the gift tax annual exclusion and the tax exclusive 
tax base). 
131 See Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity, supra note 129, at 374 (―In addition, since wealthier 
individuals are more likely to be financially able to make substantial lifetime gifts, taxing lifetime transfers 
and transfers made at death in the same manner helps to ensure fairness and progressivity in the overall 
transfer tax system.‖); Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 126, at 1371 (―But even assuming that some favoritism 
[for lifetime gifts] should be shown, the existing system provides this favoritism in an irrational and 
inequitable manner. . . .the larger the estate, the more advantageous transfer by gift becomes.‖); PECHMAN, 
supra note 79, at 232 (―And among those who do make gifts, the law discriminates in favor of wealthier 
donors by rewarding them with larger tax savings than less wealthy donors obtain on gifts of the same value.  
This feature stems from the exclusion of the gift tax from the base of the tax.‖). 
132 See Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity, supra note 129, at 374 (―Unification of the gift and 
estate taxes is designed to ensure that taxes are a relatively neutral factor in an individual's decision whether 
to make a lifetime gift.‖); Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 126, at 1390 (―[T]he Government is not appropriately 
concerned with the rate of transfer of wealth from parents to children and should leave such matters to family 
decision, or at least it is not so concerned as to provide tax incentives to affect whatever may be a family‘s 
natural inclinations in such matters.‖). 
133 See SURREY, supra note 21, at 273 (―If the purpose is to move property into younger and 
presumably more venturesome hands, in a desire to produce economic benefits by supposedly increasing the 
mobility and risk-taking capacity of capital, analysis is then required as to whether this result in fact occurs.  
If the gifts are in trust then the economic effect is not likely to differ from continued ownership by the 
donor.‖); Kurtz & Surrey, supra 126, at 1391 (―Most lifetime gifts are of marketable securities placed in 
trust, and they are made at a time when the donor is quite elderly.  A gift to a trust extending for a long period 
of time seems little different in terms of economic mobility and risk-taking than continued ownership by the 
donor.‖). 
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themselves be subject to tax.
134
  As with estate tax and income tax, the additional 
grossed-up tax would be built into the gift tax tables, which the taxpayer could easily 
access.
135
  According to the Treasury Department, with this additional unity between the 
transfer taxes, certain tax provisions could be repealed
136
 and gift completion rules could 
be simplified.
137
  Under the proposed 1984 rules, retained powers would be ignored to 
allow for an easy-to-complete rule of gift completion;
138
 retained interests would be 
ignored for valuation purposes, but a retained interest gift would be considered complete 
at the expiration of the retained interest.
139
 The retained interest rule would decrease 
dependence on actuarial tables and would produce more accurate valuation.
140
 
However, the 1984 proposal also presents serious problems by ignoring retained 
powers and using easy-to-complete rules.  Complex retained power transfers would 
proliferate (contrary to the proposal‘s stated goal of simplification) because the wealthy 
generally care more about retaining power over transferred assets as compared to 
retaining an interest in the transferred property.
141
  Moreover, under the proposal, post-
transfer growth, which may be substantial, would pass to third parties without being 
subject to transfer taxes.  Some of the most significant anti-abuse provisions, such as 
sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038, which require date of death value estate tax inclusion for 
lifetime transfers with retained powers, would be eliminated.  Though the 1984 proposal 
states that an adjustment of the gift for post-transfer appreciation is unwarranted ―because 
a lifetime transfer deprives the donor of the use of the property and the use of any money 
used to pay gift tax on the transfer,‖142 that rationale falls short when one considers that 
                                                 
134 See Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity, supra note 129, at 377-78 (―Application of the gift tax 
on a tax-inclusive basis would eliminate the major disparity between the transfer tax treatment of lifetime 
gifts and transfers at death.‖). 
135 See Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity, supra note 129, at 377. 
136 Primarily, I.R.C. § 2035(a), the section that deals with gifts of life insurance and transfers of 
―taxable strings‖ within three years of decedent‘s death, would be repealed.  The same is true for I.R.C. 
§ 2035(b), which ―grosses up‖ the decedent‘s estate by adding the gift tax paid as an estate tax inclusion.  
Repealing I.R.C. § 2035(b) makes sense as that provision is duplicative of the main 1984 unification 
proposal.  Inter vivos charitable Lead Trusts (―CLTs‖), which, under current law, are subject to abuse, would 
be reformed under the 1984 proposal.  ―The creator of such a trust would be treated as owning the property 
for transfer tax purposes until the vesting of the non-charitable interest or his or her death, if sooner.‖: that 
would mean that the donor‘s third party remainder gift would be accurately valued at the time that interest 
vests.  Id. at 379. 
137 See Tax Reform for Fairness Simplicity, supra note 129, at 378-83 (―Finally, by removing the 
major incentive for disguising testamentary transfers as lifetime gifts, the proposal would permit the 
simplification of the rules governing when a transfer is complete for estate and gift tax purposes.‖). 
138 Id. at 379. 
139 Id. at 380. 
140 Id. at 382 (―By delaying the imposition of transfer tax liability until the donor's interest 
terminates, the proposed rules would reduce the number of instances in which it is necessary to consult an 
actuarial table to value the transfer of a partial interest in property and would provide greater accuracy in the 
valuation of the transferred interest.‖). 
141 See RICHARD SCHMALBECK, AVOIDING FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES, RETHINKING ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION, 121-22 (William G. Gale, James R. Hines, Jr. & Joel Slemrod eds., 2001) (concluding 
that even with the great tax benefit of the annual exclusion, few wealthy taxpayers currently are influenced to 
make those lifetime transfers because ―the real barrier to full use of the annual exclusion is the strong 
preference of potential donors for the retention of economic power.‖). 
142 See text note 128, supra. 
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The stated policy of the 1932 annual exclusion was two fold: on one hand, ―to 
obviate the necessity of keeping an account of and reporting numerous small gifts and on 
the other, to fix the amount sufficiently large to cover in most cases wedding and 
Christmas gifts and occasional gifts of relatively small amounts.‖144  That stated policy, 
which highlights the exclusion‘s administrative goal, 145  was intertwined with the 
overriding purpose of the gift tax, to raise immediate revenue during the Depression 
years.
146
  Otherwise, the 1932 $5,000 exclusion would not have been such a large one, 
allowing relatively large gifts to go untaxed.
147
  In fact, together with the other gift tax 
preferences
148
 enacted with the 1932 Act,
149
 the large annual exclusion successfully 
encouraged taxable gifts.  According to economists, 1935 produced the second largest 
revenue from gift taxes when indexed for inflation.
150
 
Scholars have criticized the annual exclusion, particularly the ―present interest‖ 
requirement, and many have urged the elimination of Crummey powers,
151
 but this author 
proposes to have the annual exclusion return to its original stated purpose of eliminating 
the need to keep track of minor gifts, which do not substantially add to the donee‘s 
wealth.  The simpler gift tax, therefore, includes an annual exclusion for small outright 
gifts (capped at $2,000, with inflation adjustments, aggregated yearly per donee).
152
  
                                                 
143 See Cooper, supra note 122, at 247 (―For the time being, there are a number of steps which have 
been described above that can reasonably be taken to improve the estate and gift tax.  Those measures, in 
particular the modifications in valuation procedures to stop the absurd abuses now occurring, will do much to 
protect the tax base and improve the fairness and effectiveness of the tax in reaching existing accumulated 
wealth.  As for estate freezing, some improvements in sections 2036 and 2038 can raise the ante substantially 
for taxpayers who want to transfer future growth to their prospective heirs, and thereby limit the greatest 
abuses in this area.‖). 
144 See S. REP . NO. 665, 72D CONG., 1ST SESS. 41, reprinted in (1939-1 C. B. (Pt. 2) 525-526; H.R. 
REP . NO. 708, 72D CONG., 1ST SESS. 29-30, reprinted in 1939-1 C. B. (Pt. 2) 478). 
145 See Brown, supra note 123, at 483 (―The legislative history to the 1932 Act clearly indicates  
that the principal policy behind the gift tax annual exclusion is administrative in nature--to avoid the 
necessity of tracking small gifts which do not materially avoid the federal transfer tax system.‖). 
146 See Cooper, Ghosts of 1932, supra note 21. 
147 As Brown points out: ―. . . the $5,000 annual exclusion enacted as part of the 1932 Act was a 
very significant exclusion amount relative to the size of the specific exemption amount of $50,000 in the gift 
tax and hence would be expected to generate gifts designed to reduce future estate tax liability.‖  Brown, 
supra note 123, at 486.  In addition, he notes that if you analogize those amounts to 2012 numbers, as a ten 
percent portion of the exemption or to account for inflation, the 1932 $5,000 annual exclusion would amount, 
respectively, to $500,000 or to approximately $77,000.  Brown, supra note 123, at 486. 
148 The 1932 Act included lower rates, a separate cumulate rate structure, and a separate exemption 
amount for gifts than the ones imposed by the estate tax.  In addition, as today‘s gift tax, the 1932 gift tax was 
computed on a tax exclusive basis. 
149 Revenue Act of 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169. 
150 See Joulfaian, supra note 125, at 1924-1925. 
151 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 123; CRAWFORD, supra note 29, at 446 (―[Congress] should 
eliminate the present interest requirement and in lieu thereof, allow to qualify for the annual exclusion only 
outright transfers and transfers in trust that meet the requirements of section 2642(c).‖); Jeffrey G. Sherman, 
'Tis a Gift to Be Simple: The Need for a New Definition of "Future Interest" for Gift Tax Purposes , 55 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 585, 666 (1987) [hereinafter Sherman] (proposing that a demand right, like in Crummey, not 
constitute a present interest for annual exclusion purposes); SURREY, supra note 21, at 695. 
152 See CRAWFORD, supra note 29, at 444-45 (―Crummey trusts are complex instruments that require 
substantial professional advice; provisions like those above are entirely tax-driven.‖); Sherman, supra note 
151, at 590 (―One seldom makes a gift of a future interest without the advice and intervention of an attorney 
or other professional.‖). 
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While the current $10,000 (with inflation adjustments, making the 2015 exclusion cap at 
$14,000) annual exclusion may seem more palatable to most people, it is clear that most 
of the annual exclusion is not used for the statute‘s original stated purpose, but is instead 
used to transfer tax-free a goodly sum to third parties.
153
  While generally disallowing 
transfers in trust to qualify for the annual exclusion, the simpler gift tax allows a slightly 
different version of what is currently referred to as a minor trust under section 2503(c): it 
would extend until the donee turned thirty years of age.  At the donee‘s thirtieth birthday, 
the trust would terminate and pay out whatever was held in the trust (corpus and 
accumulated income) to the donee. 
In addition to the annual exclusion, the simplified gift tax embraces and extends 
some consumption transfers from the gift tax.  Each of these new provisions will amend 
section 2503(e) and all of the section 2503(e) exclusions will be prefaced by a statement 
that these exemptions are intended to cover consumption items and do not apply to any 
transfer that is in fact an unconsumed gratuitous property transfer.  While accepting that 
these exclusions indirectly aid the recipient by not requiring him to expend his own 
wealth for expenses and that education creates human capital, the reality is that most of 
the following consumption exclusions added in the simpler gift tax provisions are not 
thought of as gifts.  The simpler gift tax would add the following exclusions: (1) an 
expanded education exclusion; (2) a new exclusion for reasonable living expenses of any 
donee living in the donor‘s residence; and (3) a new exclusion for certain payments to 
caretakers, including family members.  These exclusions do not directly increase the 
donee‘s accumulation of assets and, like a parent‘s managerial services, they cannot from 
a pragmatic position be verified; in addition, they may not rise to the level of property 
transfers that are subject to the gift tax.
154
 
The current section 2503(e) exclusion for medical costs paid directly to the 
provider is geared to the section 213(d) definition of ―medical care.‖155  Thus, besides 
doctors‘ and hospital costs, other medical expenses that are currently excluded under 
section 2503(e) include: medical insurance,
156







 and some capital expenses.
160
  The simpler gift tax exclusion 
for education costs would be expanded and tied to the definitions of ―qualified higher 
education expenses‖ in section 529.  As such, the exclusion would not only cover tuition, 
but would also cover required fees, books, supplies, and equipment while attending an 
                                                 
153 See, e.g. CRAWFORD, supra note 29, at 444 (―Well-drafted Crummey trusts typically limit the 
withdrawal right to the annual exclusion amount (less $1,000 or so to allow for de minimis outright gifts 
during the year).‖); David Joulfaian & Kathleen McGarry, Estate and Gift Tax Incentives and Inter Vivos 
Giving, 57 NAT‘L TAX J. 429, 430 (2004) [hereinafter Joulfaian & M cGarry] (―This [annual exclusion] 
allowance permits a substantial sum to be transferred to heirs free of tax.  While yearly amounts may be 
small, consistent use of this annual exemption can lead to the tax–free transfer of large amounts of wealth.‖). 
154 They may be less than the annual exclusion amount or they may be either revocable transfers or 
licenses.  See Joseph M. Dodge, Are Gift Demand Loans of Tangible Property Subject to Gift Tax, 30 VA. L. 
REV. 181 (2010). 
155 See I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(B). 
156 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(D). 
157 I.R.C. § 213(b) (limitations on deductible medications). 
158 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(B). 
159 Meals and lodging expenses are excluded for a required hospital confinement.  In addition, 
I.R.C. § 213(d)(2) covers $50 per person per night of lodging exp enses, not lavish or extravagant, while 
receiving medical care. 
160 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(c)(1)(iii) (excluding, among other expenses, the costs of eye glasses, 
crutches, and certain medically necessary home alterations).  
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eligible educational institution, and expenses for special needs services for a special 
needs student.
161
  They would also include room and board for students enrolled at least 
half-time at an eligible educational institution.
162
 
Similar to a 1960‘s ALI exclusion proposal that ignored food, clothing, and 
living expenses ―for any person dependent upon the transferor,‖163  (capped at $3,000 
annually),
164
 the simpler gift tax would add exclusions for the reasonable living expenses 
of any donee,
165
 regardless of age, living in the same residence as the donor.  Most 
families either ignore the living expense transfers to adult dependents or non-dependents 
or, without actually calculating their value, view those expenses as not exceeding the 
annual exclusion.  Because they may not be transfers of property interests or are too 
difficult to monitor, if they are reasonable in amount and not a subterfuge for property 
wealth transfers, these consumption costs should be excluded under section 2503(e). 
The second new consumption exclusion would cover certain payments made to 
family-member caregivers.  The exclusion would allow cash amounts to be transferred to 
a family or non-family member in exchange for caregiver services provided either to the 
transferor, the transferor‘s spouse, or to a dependent living in the household of the 
transferor.  In order to qualify for this exclusion, the taxpayer would be required timely to 
file the necessary employment forms and to pay applicable income and employment taxes 
on those payments in a timely manner.  The reason for this exclusion is to state simply 
the circumstances under which a payment to a family or non-family member, reasonable 
in amount and in consideration for caretaking services, will be presumed conclusively to 
be exempt from gift taxes regardless of any local law presumptions to the contrary. 
V. COMPLIANCE 
Few donors report gifts in a timely manner and the scholars who write about the 
gift tax compliance failure believe that the causes of this problem are a lackadaisical 
reporting and penalty system.
166
  Taxpayers do not worry about filing gift tax returns 
―because (1) they know their chances of being caught are infinitesimally small and (2) 
even if they are caught, they are not likely to be penalized.‖167 
                                                 
161 I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(A).  
162 I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(B); I.R.C. § 25A(b)(3) (defining eligible student). 
163 See SURREY, supra note 21, at 190. 
164 See Casner, supra note 28, at 538-539 (―The exclusion of transfers for consumption will 
eliminate many transfers from gift taxation that are now technically subject to such taxation.  It is believed, 
however, that many of these eliminated transfers are rather widely ignored today in the gift tax area.‖). 
165 See ALI FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT: M AJOR PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN REFERENCE THERETO (1968).  One of the purposes of the ALI 
consumption exclusion was ―that there be excluded from gift taxation various so-called transfers for 
consumption, without regard to whether they in fact involved a discharge of a legal obligation to support 
another and cause the transfer tax law to be applied in the same way in all geographical areas .‖  Id. 
166 See Jay A. Soled, Paul L. Caron, Charles Davenport, and Richard Schmalbeck, Rethinking the 
Penalty for the Failure to File Gift Tax Returns, 141 TAX NOTES 757 (2013); Gans & Soled, supra note 41, at 
760-61. 
167 Gans & Soled, supra note 41, at 774.  As the basis of the poor compliance rate, Professors Gans 
and Soled cite the lack of third party information returns, the politically untenable use of random audits that 
would unlikely produce additional revenue, and, historically, the lack of enforcement of gift tax filing 
requirements.  As solutions, they propose third party (donee or trustee) information return filings, which 
would be especially productive if a transfer is made in trust; establishing a ―meaningful penalty system,‖ 
similar to the current penalty system, but where the penalty computations would not take into account the gift 
tax exemption (at the time of the article, the gift tax $1 million lifetime amount), delinquent returns would be 
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Given that there is no imperative to have preferences for lifetime transfers, apart 
from a limited annual exclusion, this article proposes to retain other gift tax benefits but 
only for donors who adhere to the filing and payment requirements.  Compliance rules in 
a verifiable gift tax should replicate the portability rules:
168
  If you don‘t properly file a 
gift tax return and pay your gift tax, you don‘t obtain the tax benefits that compliant filers 
receive. 
Depending on which benefits are denied delinquent donors, donors should be 
motivated to comply.  Denying the benefit of a tax exclusive transfer tax should increase 
self-reporting.  For greater incentives, new benefits could be added to gifts, such as 
limiting the unified credit exemption to the 2009 level $3.5 million unified credit,
169
 but 
for the first $1.5 million in taxable gifts, provide a lower rate or an additional run-through 
regime similar to a pre-1977 gift tax model.
170
  Additional gift tax benefits for compliant 
donors should produce more revenue in line with the goal of the 1932 gift tax.
171
 
Historically, instead of utilizing even simple tax minimization techniques to the 
maximum extent allowable,
172
 wealthy taxpayers have reacted to changes in tax rates by 
accelerating inter vivos transfers.
173
  That was particularly true in 1976 in anticipation of 
the new law‘s elimination of lower gift tax rates and the separate exemption run-through 
scheme.
174
  According to Joulfaian, 1976 was a banner year for gifts before the 1976 Tax 
Act took effect in 1977, mainly due to the enormous sensitivity to rate changes between 
those two years.
175
  While the revenue effect of a simpler verifiable gift tax is uncertain, 
the evidence from 1976 suggests a positive revenue effect from changes that would be 
policy improvements to the current gift tax. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article is to propose a simplified verifiable gift tax, to reassert 
the basic principles of transfer taxes, to encourage simple, outright gifts, and to eliminate 
some major abuses in the current gift tax regime.  To accomplish these goals, the 
                                                                                                                                     
subject to a hefty twenty-five percent maximum penalty if they are five or more months late, with interest 
accruing from the required filing date.  Id. at 777-78. 
168 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
169 Recent legislation has returned the unified credit exemption equivalent to 2009 levels.  See, e.g., 
S. 2899, 113TH CONG., 2D SESS. § 2(b)(1) (amending I.R.C.§ 2010(c)(3) by reducing the ―basic exclusion 
amount‖ exemption to $3.5 million for transfers after December 31, 2014) (proposed by Sen. Bernard 
Sanders.). 
170 See supra notes 130, 148 and accompanying text. 
171 See Cooper, Ghosts of 1932, supra note 21. 
172 See Joulfaian & McGarry , supra note 153, at 419 (―Overall, we conclude that while taxes are an 
important consideration in transfer behavior of the rich, their behavior is not universally consistent with a tax 
minimization strategy.‖) (―[I]ndividuals fail to exploit fully available avenues of tax avoidance.‖).  Id. at 430. 
173 See Joulfaian, supra note 125, at 1927 (―Using data for gifts made in the years 1933 through 
1988, the findings suggest that the wealthy are quite responsive to taxes in the timing of their gifts, 
particularly in the short run.‖); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX‘N, 112TH CONG., M ODELING THE FEDERAL 
REVENUE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 26 (Joint Comm. Print 2012). 
174 See supra notes 130, 148 and accompanying text. 
175 See Joulfaian, supra note 125, at 1924 (―[G]ifts made in 1976, in anticipation of the higher tax 
rates in 1977, surpass those made in any other year since the enactment of the tax.‖).  One other factor that 
probably contributed to the number of gifts in that year was that, under the 1976 Act, carryover basis would 
be extended to bequests with the repeal of I.R.C. § 1014 (date of death (generally ―stepped up‖) basis rule for 
transfers at death).  While later, the repeal of I.R.C. § 1014 was itself retroactively repealed, in 1976 that 
post-enactment event could not be anticipated.  Therefore, some of the increase in gifts in 1976 could be 
attributed to the fact that the wealthy anticipated the estate tax inclusion benefit was about to disappear, 
equalizing the capital gains effect between gifts and bequests. 
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proposed tax would simplify gift completion rules, adopt a hard-to-complete rule of 
transfer taxation, reduce the annual exclusion while expanding the consumption 
exclusion, and employ loss of preference inducements to increase gift tax compliance. 
